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“Rape is unique. No other violent crime is so fraught with controversy, so 
enmeshed in dispute and in the politics of gender and sexuality.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two freshmen get ready for an exciting Saturday night at their new college.2 
The man, John, started drinking earlier in the day as part of a freshman initiation. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2017; B.A., 
Political Science, California State University, Chico, 2013. I want to extend my deepest thanks to Distinguished 
Professor Michael Vitiello for his ubiquitous guidance in this Comment and in my legal education. I also want 
to thank the Board of Editors of Volume 47 & 48 of The University of the Pacific Law Review—you have all 
taught me so much and will always be an inspiration to me. Last, but not least, I thank my best friend Chloe for 
always being my rock. 
1. JON KRAKAUER, MISSOULA (Penguin Random House, 2015) (quoting DAVID LISAK, LORI GARDINIER, 
SARAH C. NICKSA & ASHLEY M. COTE, FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN (2010)). 
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The bonding ritual involved consuming large amounts of alcohol, resulting in 
stumbling and slurred words. Later describing his intoxication, John said it was, 
“the drunkest [he had] ever been.”3 
The woman, Jane, took shots of vodka and drank numerous screwdrivers in 
her friend’s dorm room in an effort to get rid of the previous night’s hangover.4 
The drinks led to her falling down. A friend then helped her back to her dorm 
room, which was in John’s building.5 While heading to her room, Jane met 
John’s roommate and she followed him to John’s room.6 Soon enough, John and 
Jane were engaged in what observers described as “something sexual.”7 Jane’s 
friends took her home before anything further occurred, but not until after Jane 
gave John her number.8 
John and Jane later met up at the campus quad where they had sex that same 
night.9 A couple walking through the quad spotted them and notified campus 
security and police. John was then arrested and charged with rape.10 The next 
morning, John and Jane had little memory of the events.11 
The night of their sexual encounter, John and Jane both had blood alcohol 
levels above the legal limit, and possibly, far above the legal limit.12 Like the 
example of John and Jane’s, circumstances in which both participants are 
intoxicated and engage in sexual intercourse are more prevalent on college 
 
2. The following hypothetical is a compilation of the facts from a civil case, the events of which occurred 
at Occidental College, and a criminal case from Davis, CA. See Richard Dorment, Occidental Justice: The 
Disastrous Fallout When Drunk Sex Meets Academic Bureaucracy, ESQUIRE (Mar. 25, 2015), available at 
http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a33751/occidental-justice-case/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (discussing a civil action from Occidental College between two freshman students who 
had a drunken sexual encounter, and the male was subsequently expelled); Lauren Keene, Jury acquits Davis 
man of rape charges, THE DAVIS ENTERPRISE (Feb. 3, 2013), available at http://www.davisenterprise.com/ 
local-news/crime-fire-courts/jury-acquits-davis-man-of-rape-charges/ (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (discussing the acquittal of a 21-year-old Davis man charged with rape after witnesses saw him 
having sex with a woman near the Amtrak station when both he and the woman had .23 and .17 BAC levels, 
respectively). 
3. Dorment, supra note 2. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. See Keene, supra note 2 (discussing the acquittal of a 21-year-old Davis man charged with rape after 
witnesses saw him having sex with a woman near the Amtrak station when both he and the woman had 0.23 and 
0.17 BAC levels, respectively). 
11. Dorment, supra note 2. 
12. See id. (discussing that while the parties’ blood-alcohol levels were unknown, both had little-to-no 
memory of the sexual encounter); see also Keene, supra note 2 (discussing how the man’s and woman’s blood-
alcohol content was 0.17 and 0.23, respectively). 
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campuses now than in the past.13 This raises the question of how the criminal law 
deals with situations where both the male and female are heavily intoxicated and 
engage in sexual intercourse but only one is accused of sexual assault. 
Statutes and social attitudes regarding rape have changed throughout our 
nation’s history.14 In contrast, the relevance of intoxication as a defense to rape 
has not changed.15 Adopted in 1962, Section 2.08 of the Model Penal Code 
(MPC) established the long-standing law of intoxication as a defense.16 But at 
least some members of the American Law Institute (ALI) believe that the 
relevance of intoxication as a defense to rape should change.17 
In a movement to alter the law, the ALI constructed a new tentative draft for 
the MPC that eliminates Section 2.08 applicability to the Sexual Assault and 
Related Offenses provisions.18 This proposed change would be a drastic shift in 
the law of intoxication and rape.19 This Comment argues that the ALI should 
adopt this proposed rule because it will level the disparity of consequences for 
voluntary intoxication between the sexes and make them equal under the law, 
leading to fewer injustices in the now prevalent occurrence of mutually 
intoxicated sexual intercourse on college campuses.20 
Part II of this Comment provides background information on the traditional 
law of intoxication and then on the related provisions of the 1962 MPC.21 It will 
also examine how John could be criminally prosecuted under current law.22 Part 
II then discusses the MPC’s proposed changes to Section 2.08 and its effect on 
the Sexual Assault and Related Offenses provisions, Sections 213.1 through 
213.8.23 
Part III discusses the practical implications of the proposed changes in the 
law, both generally and in cases of mutually intoxicated sexual intercourse on 
college campuses.24 Eliminating § 2.08 would alter the principle of culpability, 
and Part III examines why intoxication should be viewed significantly as it is in 
the proposed draft by explaining the prevalence of college-aged drinking and the 
 
13.  SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUSES: WHAT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ARE DOING ABOUT IT, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. 2 (Dec. 2005), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205521.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
14. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 567–74 (Matthew Bender & Company, 
Inc., 6th ed. 2012) (discussing changes from traditional to reform rape statutes and changes from the original 
perspective to the modern perspective regarding rape). 
15. Id. at 568. 
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985). 
17. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 568. 
18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(4) (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015). 
19. Id. 
20. Infra Part IV. 
21. Infra Part II. 
22. Infra Part II. 
23. Infra Part II. 
24. Infra Part III. 
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effects of alcohol on the mental processes.25 Lastly, Part III poses questions 
concerning the effectiveness of the proposed changes, the challenges the 
proposals present, and the remaining gaps in this area of the law.26 Part IV 
concludes that the proposed changes, if adopted, would produce fairer results and 
would rightfully address the issue of mutually intoxicated sexual assault.27 
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A. The Traditional Approach to Intoxication 
The use of intoxication as a defense has been quite limited in our nation’s 
history.28 The early common law provided zero forgiveness for an intoxicated 
offender, regardless of whether the intoxication was gross or minimal.29 Some 
commentators, including Blackstone, argued that intoxication was an aggravating 
circumstance.30 However, efforts to make intoxication an aggravating 
circumstance were unfruitful until the supporters of the prevailing rules exhibited 
doubts about the strictness of the current law.31 The supporters’ ideological 
changes radically modified the law in the nineteenth century, which relaxed the 
rules towards a “more humane direction.”32 
An 1819 murder case first suggested that voluntary intoxication might 
demonstrate a lack of premeditation, but could not be a complete defense.33 In 
Montana v. Egelhoff, Justice Scalia stated that during the nineteenth century 
“courts carved out an exception to the common law’s traditional across-the-board 
condemnation of the drunken offender, allowing a jury to consider a defendant’s 
intoxication when assessing whether he possessed the mental state needed to 
commit the crime charged, where the crime was one requiring a ‘specific 
intent,’” but not when charged with a general intent crime.34 If the distinction is 
sound, Chief Justice Traynor stated in People v. Hood that: 
[A] drunk man is capable of forming intent to do something simple, such 
as strike another, unless he is so drunk that he has reached the stage of 
unconsciousness. What he is not capable as a sober man of doing is 
 
25. Infra Part III. 
26.  Infra Part IV. 
27. Infra Part IV. 
28. Jerome Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1944). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 1048. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 46 (1996). 
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exercising judgment about the social consequences of his acts or 
controlling his impulses toward anti-social acts.35 
General intent refers to any offense in which the only mens rea required is a 
blameworthy state of mind, while specific intent refers to an offense that 
expressly requires proof of the explicit mental state.36 Therefore, a drunk man is 
capable of forming the mental state required for a general intent crime such as 
battery, but may not be capable of forming the mental state required for common 
law burglary, which requires the specific intent of “intent to commit a felony 
therein.”37 
The exception most importantly impacted murder charges.38 A sufficiently 
intoxicated offender might be spared the death penalty because intoxication 
prevented him from forming the requisite mens rea for first-degree murder.39 
Regarding rape or sexual assault, however, an offender’s intoxication provided 
no defense.40 Rape, as defined at common law, was a general intent offense.41 As 
a result, evidence of the offender’s intoxication was irrelevant and, therefore, 
inadmissible.42 
The historic hesitation to allow an offender to rely on evidence of 
intoxication as a defense is easy to understand.43 One of the main concerns was 
“the easiness of counterfeiting the disability.”44 Additionally, permitting 
intoxication as a defense was imprudent because statistics showed that 
intoxication caused most homicides and other crimes.45 Lastly, intoxication could 
be used as a shield for avoiding responsibility.46 
Despite strong concerns about allowing an intoxication defense, scholars 
pointed out the injustices that may result from the traditional view on alcohol.47 
 
35. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 458 (1969). 
36. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 138. 
37. Id. (emphasis added). 
38. See Hall, supra note 28, at 1051 (discussing the impact of the exception on various crimes). 
39. Id. For the remainder of the Comment, I will use “he” to describe an offender. Statistics show that 
males are the predominant perpetrators of rape and sexual assault. See Sexual Assault Statistics, ONE IN FOUR 
(last visited July 15, 2016), available at http://www.oneinfourusa.org/statistics.php (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
40. See id. at 1061–66 (distinguishing between the use of the exculpatory doctrine in specific intent 
crimes versus general intent crimes). 
41. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 567. 
42. Id. at 322. 
43. Hall, supra note 28, at 1047 (quoting HALE, HISTORY OF THE CROWN 32 (1736)). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.08 cmt. at 352 (1985). 
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This created a dichotomy of views that the drafters of the 1962 MPC had to 
address.48 
B. The 1962 Model Penal Code 
Criminal law is premised on the notion that one should only be held 
criminally responsible for the harm that he causes.49 A person can only cause the 
harm and be convicted of an offense when he has the requisite mens rea.50 As 
scholar Sanford H. Kadish noted, “it is deeply rooted in our moral sense of 
fitness that punishment entails blame and that, therefore, punishment may not 
justly be imposed where the person is not blameworthy.”51 The mens rea, 
therefore, relates to blame.52 For example, a defendant can cause harm without 
having a culpable mental state (e.g., John in the hypothetical).53 
The drafters of the 1962 MPC followed this basic principle of criminal law in 
implementing Section 2.02, which states, “unless some element of mental 
culpability is proved with respect to each material element of the offense, no 
valid criminal conviction may be obtained.”54 The MPC abandoned the common 
law distinction between general and specific intent crimes and replaced it with 
four terms of culpability: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.55 If a 
statute does not include the culpability required to establish a material element, 
then that element is established if, at a minimum, the person acted recklessly.56 
The MPC states that a person acts recklessly if “he consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result 
from his conduct.”57 
Intoxicated actors create difficulty in the mens rea analysis because 
intoxicants distort judgment by reducing the actor’s ability to control his feelings, 
impulses, and conduct, leading to an inability to form intent.58 The MPC permits 
actors to use intoxication as a defense in two circumstances:59 if the actor’s 
 
48. See id. (discussing opponent’s view of the concept that intoxication should not be considered as a 
defense). 
49. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 3. 
50. Id. at 117. 
51. Sanford H. Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal Law—A Dialogue, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 10 (1980). 
52. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 3. 
53. Supra Part I (discussing the John and Jane hypothetical). 
54. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02 cmt. at 229 (1985). 
55. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 160 (Thompson Reuters, 6th ed. 
2012). 
56. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1985). 
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985). 
58. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 317. 
59. Id. at 330. 
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intoxication is severe enough to negate an element of the offense60 or if the 
intoxication was not self-induced.61 
Section 2.08 lays out these two exceptions for when a person faces 
prosecution for a crime that requires recklessness to establish criminal liability.62 
Section 2.08 states that if a person “due to self-induced intoxication is unaware of 
a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness 
is immaterial.”63 Therefore, when the offense requires recklessness, the law 
irrefutably presumes that an actor has the requisite mens rea when he is 
voluntarily intoxicated.64 This, in effect, equates the actor’s decision to get drunk 
with the particular risk that he took (e.g., that he would engage in sexual 
intercourse without consent—two acts that do not obviously go hand in hand).65 
The MPC tackles this issue head-on in its comments and provides its 
justifications for the adoption of Section 2.08.66 The commentary balances the 
social value of intoxication against the potential dangers and difficulties of 
litigating an intoxicated actor’s state of mind.67 The commentary’s decision relies 
on its finding that, “Drunkenness usually does import recklessness, and, anyhow, 
it creates difficulties of proof to allow the issue to be litigated.”68 The MPC 
further justifies its position by stating that it is fair to equate the risk of becoming 
drunk with the risk of committing a crime is fair because the risks of excessive 
drinking are now so prevalent in society that everyone is aware of them.69 
What does this mean for John? John was aware of the risks created by his 
conduct while intoxicated, and is presumed reckless under the MPC.70 This 
presumption has monumental effects for an eighteen-year-old accused of rape.71 
 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 330–31. 
63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (1985). 
64. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 331. 
65. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.08 cmt. at 359 (1985). 
66. Id. at 352. 
67. Id. at 359. 
Becoming so drunk as to destroy temporarily the actor’s powers of perception and of judgment is conduct 
which plainly has no affirmative social value to counterbalance the potential danger. . . . Added to this are the 
impressive difficulties posed in litigating the foresight of any particular actor at the time when he imbibes and 
the relative rarity of cases where intoxication really does engender unawareness as distinguished from 
imprudence. 
Id. 
68. Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 600 (1963) (citing 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. 3 at 8–9 (AM. LAW INST., Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)). 
69. MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment to § 2.08, at 359 (1985). (“Awareness of the potential consequences 
of excessive drinking on the capacity of human beings to gauge the risks incident to their conduct is by now so 
dispersed in our culture that it is not unfair to postulate a general equivalence between the risks created by the 
conduct of the drunken actor and the risks created by his conduct in becoming drunk.”). Id. 
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. at 359 (1985). 
71. Id. 
2017 / The Model Penal Code’s New Approach to Rape and Intoxication 
430 
Assume that John is charged with rape. Traditionally, the law defined rape as 
a male engaging in sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, without her 
consent.72 After a wave of reform, many states now divide the offense into 
degrees and redefine the offense in gender-neutral terms.73 Several states, 
including New York, adopted statutes based on the MPC.74 New York law states 
that a person is guilty of rape in the first degree if he “engages in sexual 
intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion; or who is incapable of 
consent by reason of being physically helpless; or who is less than eleven years 
old; or who is less than thirteen years old and the actor is eighteen years old or 
more.”75 
Similar to the MPC, New York’s rape statute does not specify a mens rea 
requirement.76 As a result, under Section 2.02(3), a court would read in the mens 
rea term of recklessness.77 Under Section 2.08, John is presumed reckless 
because of his voluntary intoxication and, thus, would be guilty of first-degree 
rape if the actus reus, voluntary act, is proven.78 Therefore, although John was 
not aware of how his intoxication would affect his conduct, the MPC sacrifices 
his “rare” circumstance for the perceived benefit in avoiding the difficulty in 
litigating a particular offender’s unawareness.79 The result of this sacrifice is that 
John could face 1.5 to 25 years imprisonment, registration as a sex offender for 
20 years to life, and required treatment either in jail or prison.80 
The offender’s unawareness could take various forms. For example, John 
may have been intoxicated but still understood that Jane did not consent, in 
which case he would not have a defense.81 Or, John may have been so drunk that 
he did not recognize that Jane was too drunk to give consent.82 Another 
possibility is that John never consumed that much alcohol before and was 
unaware of its effects; he might not have understood that consuming that much 
 
72. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 568. 
73. Id. 
74. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL PENAL CODE 3 
(Mar. 12, 1999), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf (on file with The 
University of Pacific Law Review). 
75. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (2001). 
76. See id. (defining rape in the first degree). 
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1985). 
78. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985); DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 85. 
79. See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.08 cmt. at 359 (1985) (describing the rationale for adopting the rule in 
order to avoid difficulties in litigating the foresight of a particular actor engaging in voluntary intoxication). 
80. New York Sexual Assault Laws, FINDLAW (last visited July 15, 2016), http://statelaws.findlaw.com/ 
new-york-law/new-york-sexual-assault-laws.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); 
FAQ, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES (last visited July 15, 2016), http://www.criminaljustice. 
ny.gov/nsor/faq.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
81. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 at 358–59 (1985) (comparing the state of mind required in other 
crimes, such as burglary, to show the impact of intoxication in determining an accused’s state of mind). 
82. Infra Part III.A.2.b. 
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alcohol would cause him to participate in harmful sexual behavior.83 In its current 
form, the MPC does not allow for considerations of these subtle distinctions 
between the offender’s unawareness; the offender is both intoxicated and 
reckless, or he is not.84 
The law further protects the female and her mental state, which exacerbates 
the injustice John faces when he is denied the opportunity to rebut his presumed 
recklessness.85 Under New York law, a person is guilty of second-degree rape 
“when ‘being eighteen years old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse 
with another person less than fifteen years old; or . . . with another person who is 
incapable of consent by reason of being mentally disabled or mentally 
incapacitated.’”86 
Jane is protected by the language “mentally incapacitated.”87 Jane’s 
intoxication legally renders her mentally incapacitated and shielded by the law, 
while John’s intoxication subjects him to criminal liability and punishment.88 
Regardless of the fact that Jane and John were mutually and, arguably, equally 
intoxicated, the law protects Jane and condemns John.89 Consequently, the MPC 
and those states that adopt similar provisions contribute to a gender imbalance in 
cases that prosecute only one side of a double-sided intoxication.90 
C. The Model Penal Code’s Proposed Changes 
The ALI is currently amending the MPC’s provisions on Sexual Assault and 
Related Offenses.91 In the current proposal, Section 213.0(4) states, “the 
provisions of Model Penal Code Section 2.08(2) shall not apply to this Article.”92 
The “Article” mentioned is Article 213, which is the Sexual Assault and Related 
Offenses provision.93 
The proposed draft, in effect, rejects the premise that an offender is 
automatically reckless because he became voluntarily intoxicated.94 Instead, it 
would require that liability for the offenses in Sections 213.1 through 213.8 be 
proven by evidence of the offender’s actual subjective awareness for each 
 
83. Id. 
84. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985). 
85. See id. 
86. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30 (2001). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. See generally, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30 (2001). 
91. Model Penal Code, THE AM. L. INST. (last visited Jan 4, 2016), https://www.ali.org/publications/ 
show/model-penal-code/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(4) at 1 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015). 
93. Id. 
94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(4) at 190 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015). 
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material element.95 If the offender lacks the subjective awareness required for the 
material element, i.e. due to voluntary intoxication, he cannot be held liable.96 
The drafters explain the change by referencing a situation similar to John and 
Jane’s situation.97 They pose a hypothetical in which a college student at a 
fraternity party drinks a couple of beers and then a shot of whiskey.98 In the 
process of swallowing the whiskey, he is surely aware of the substantial risk of 
becoming intoxicated, and also surely aware of the substantial risk that he could 
engage in typical drunken behavior such as falling down, running into objects, 
shouting, or even breaking items.99 However, unlike the current version of 
Section 2.08, the proposed draft does not equate the college student’s awareness 
of consuming whiskey with the awareness of a substantial risk that he will 
commit rape.100 
While the proposed draft eliminates Section 2.08’s application to the Sexual 
Assault and Related Offenses provisions, it keeps the protection for victims who 
are “incapable of expressing unwillingness due to intoxication” intact.101 The 
draft justifies retaining this safeguard because voluntary intoxication should not 
be equated with a victim waiving his or her right to “autonomous choice and 
bodily integrity.”102 
However, the draft also acknowledges two things: (1) college-aged victims 
often are assaulted by people they know; and (2) in those circumstances, 
“[t]ypically the victim has not been duped but rather has voluntarily chosen to 
drink.”103 While voluntary intoxication does not waive bodily integrity and does 
not constitute consent in itself, the draft states that voluntary intoxication also 
does not preclude a person from giving consent.104 The draft does not permit an 
offender to set out to purposely intoxicate a victim, become intoxicated himself, 
and then use intoxication as a defense.105 For instance, if John purposely got Jane 
drunk, and then had sex with her, he would not be able to use his intoxication as 
a defense. 
Generally, date-rape drug cases would come out the same under the current 
law and the proposed law because the offender’s mens rea existed before he got 
intoxicated; he purposely set out to intoxicate the victim in order to commit the 
offense and cannot claim he failed to appreciate the victim’s mental state.106 In 
 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 189. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(2)(c) cmt. at 85 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015). 
102. Id. at 86. 
103. Id. at 85–86. 
104. Id. at 86. 
105. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.5 cmt. at 190 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015). 
106. Id. at 189. 
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these situations, the prosecution could still prove that the accused was aware of 
the victim’s inability to consent because of his actions prior to his intoxicated 
state.107 
The recent case at Stanford University provides a good example of how a 
prosecutor might still gain a conviction even in an instance in which the offender 
has been drinking.108 In early January 2015, witnesses observed Stanford student 
Brock Turner standing over an unconscious female lying on the ground next to a 
dumpster.109 In responding to a sexual assault claim against him, Turner later told 
police that he left a fraternity house with the victim.110 Turner stated that he and 
the victim then kissed and ended up on the ground where he digitally penetrated 
her for five minutes, but he did not remove his pants or expose his penis.111 
Turner smelled of alcohol when he was handcuffed and doctors stated the victim 
had an estimated blood alcohol concentration of .22% at the time of the 
assault.112 Despite having consumed “about seven cans of Rolling Rock beer and 
a couple of swigs of Fireball,” Turner admitted that he remembered everything 
that happened and that he consciously decided to engage in sexual activity with 
the victim.113 Thus, even though he was intoxicated, Turner did not claim such 
mental impairment that he failed to realize what he was doing.114 Additionally, 
the prosecutor could rebut any claim of lack of familiarity with the effects of 
drugs and alcohol by reference to Turner’s prior experience demonstrating his 
familiarity with drugs and alcohol.115 
Overall, the draft presents an innovative approach to rape prosecutions by 
recognizing that a standard that penalizes any sexual activity with an intoxicated 
individual is inappropriate.116 If adopted, the proposal permits admitting evidence 
of both the victim’s and the accused’s mental state.117 Consequently, if John were 
charged with rape, he would have the opportunity to introduce evidence of his, as 
well as Jane’s, intoxication in order to disprove his subjective awareness.118 
Although the protection of victims under the law remains largely the same, the 
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progressive recommendations in the mens rea requirement provide more equal 
protection for John and Jane, two equal participants in a drunken sexual 
encounter. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE MODEL PENAL CODE 
This section addresses what could occur if the ALI adopts the tentative draft 
and its changes.119 
A. How the Proposed Change Will Improve on the Current Code 
The proposed change will improve upon the current code by leveling 
culpability and liability,120 by accommodating mutually intoxicated sexual assault 
scenarios,121 and by eliminating gender-biased protection.122 
1. Culpability 
One reason for adopting the proposed rule lies in the basic meaning of mens 
rea in criminal law: culpability.123 Prominent criminal law scholar Glanville 
Williams, among other scholars, pointed out the injustice that would result from 
the MPC’s original stance on intoxication.124 Williams observed, “if a man is 
punished for doing something when drunk that he would not have done when 
sober, is he not in plain truth punished for getting drunk?”125 
While allowing intoxication to rebut the mens rea of purpose or knowledge, 
the MPC does not allow the same rebuttal for the mens rea of recklessness or 
negligence.126 If the mens rea required is recklessness or negligence, the MPC 
comments state that a situation involving either of these mens rea raises “no 
problem of importance in the ordinary case where drink . . . induced a temporary 
change in personality, impairing judgment or reducing inhibition or control.”127 
Drunkenness, the MPC commentary claims, is not “logically relevant to the 
existence or nonexistence of any element of the offense and, if all elements of the 
offense are established, conviction should follow in spite of intoxication.”128 
 
119. Infra Part III.A.–B. 
120. Infra Part III.A.1. 
121. Infra Part III.A.2. 
122. Infra Part III.A.3. 
123. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 118. 
124. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.08 cmt. at 352 (1985). 
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Not only is considering intoxication in offenses requiring recklessness or 
negligence logically irrelevant in the current MPC but it is also consistent with 
the position taken in the common law.129 The common law regards intoxication 
as a “simple infirmity of impaired control,” which offers “no stronger a basis for 
formal adjustments in the grading offenses or for complete exculpation than do 
infirmities produced by a variety of other causes.”130 
The members of the Advisory Committee for the 1962 MPC did not 
unanimously agree on isolating “recklessness” as a mens rea element irrefutable 
by evidence of intoxication.131 Judge Learned Hand and other members saw no 
significant reason for carving out this special rule.132 Judge Hand was of the view 
that if, as defined in Section 2.02(2)(c), recklessness requires that a person 
“consciously disregard a risk,”133 then evidence of severe drunkenness should be 
permitted to negate the actor’s consciousness of the risk.134 Since awareness of 
the risk is the root of moral culpability, when that awareness is absent the result 
is a liability much higher than the degree of culpability.135 
Although opponents of the current MPC stance, including Williams and 
Judge Hand, urged to eliminate any special rule and instead advocated that the 
law should require proving what the actor foresaw at the time of alcohol 
consumption, the MPC ultimately adopted the special rule.136 This special rule 
placed John, and those similarly situated to him, in an unjust position. Offenders 
who did not have the ability to form intent presumably reject the notion that 
severe intoxication is legally irrelevant. They presumably reject the notion that 
they were consciously aware of the result that consuming alcohol would have on 
them and their actions. Lastly, they surely reject the notion that their intoxication 
automatically establishes their mens rea. All of these notions lend to a liability 
disproportionate to culpability.137 
Adopting the proposed change in the MPC draft would remedy the 
disproportion between liability and culpability.138 As noted in the draft’s 
commentary, assuming that John, who was most likely aware of the substantial 
risk of becoming drunk since it was not his first time drinking, was also aware of 
a substantial risk that he would commit rape is illogical.139 A college student like 
John may have been consciously aware that taking shots would result in a change 
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in his behavior and loss in bodily control, but his moral choice in consuming 
alcohol is not the equivalent of the moral choice he makes when he commits a 
crime.140 
By removing Section 2.08 as applied to Sections 213.0 through 213.11, the 
proposed draft treats John’s awareness of becoming drunk and awareness of 
committing rape as separate concepts; he is only liable if there is proof of his 
culpability.141 The draft eliminates the disproportion because if John’s culpability 
were proven, he would receive the appropriate liability; conversely, if his 
culpability were not proven, he would not be liable.142 
Additionally, Section 2.08 is contrary to the MPC’s structure.143 The MPC 
rests on the principle that specific levels of fault are attributed to each element of 
an offense.144 Yet, it carved out a special rule for intoxication by using a 
balancing analysis, thus thwarting its own fundamental concept.145 Adopting the 
proposed change would eliminate this anomaly and restore the MPC to its 
doctrine of proportional liability to culpability.146 In addition to leveling 
culpability and liability, the proposed change will also accommodate mutually 
intoxicated sexual assault scenarios.147 
2. Accommodation for Mutually Intoxicated Sexual Assault Scenarios 
The law should accommodate mutually intoxicated sexual assault scenarios 
because of the prevalence of college-aged drinking148 and because of the serious 
effects of alcohol on the mental processes.149 
a. Prevalence of College-Aged Drinking 
The proposed changes to the MPC focusing on intoxication may lead one to 
wonder why the drafters are altering the law in this area now? Referring to the 
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hypothetical about the college student posed in the commentary to Section 2.08, 
it suggests that an ordinary self-induced intoxicated actor now raises a “problem 
of importance.”150 
When the accused is an alcoholic, the 1962 Code commentary refers to cases 
where courts mitigated prison terms and allowed discussion of the accused’s 
intoxication for crimes, such as being drunk in public.151 While the Code 
recognizes alcoholic offenders as a class that deserves special treatment, it does 
not recognize heavy social drinkers as a class that should receive special 
treatment under the criminal law.152 
At the same time, the Code commentary states that the consequences of 
excessive drinking are so plain that claiming ignorance should not preclude 
deeming an offender criminally reckless.153 While claiming the consequences are 
known to all society, the Code comments do not appreciate the societal norm of 
excessive drinking, especially among college-aged people.154 
Alcohol-related problems on college campuses are now a major public 
concern.155 Drinking settings include fraternity parties, athletic events, residence 
halls, off-campus housing areas with a high-proportion of students, and off-
campus bars.156 The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
(NIAAA) was founded about 40 years ago on the premise that alcoholism was an 
adult disease.157 With more research, data, and insights, the NIAAA increased its 
focus on young adult and underage drinking.158 
Through national, large-scale surveys conducted over 20 years, data indicates 
that alcohol dependence is highest among ages 18–20 and second highest among 
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ages 21–24.159 Over time, the NIAAA found that college drinking is “extremely 
widespread.”160 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found 
that people ages 18–24 have the highest prevalence of binge drinking at 28.2 
percent, and that age group also drinks the most excessively, consuming an 
average of “9.3 drinks on occasion.”161 
The NIAAA found that four out of five college students drink alcohol.162 
One-half of those students binge drink.163 The NIAAA defines binge drinking as 
“a pattern of drinking that brings blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels to 
0.08 g/dL. This typically occurs after 4 drinks for women and 5 drinks for men—
in about 2 hours.”164 One step below binge drinking is heavy drinking, which 
constitutes drinking “5 or more drinks on the same occasion on each of 5 or more 
days in the past 30 days.”165 A step below heavy drinking is moderate alcohol 
consumption, which is considered consuming one drink per day as a woman and 
up to two drinks per day as a man.166 Therefore, according to the NIAAA, one-
half of the female college students who drink alcohol consume four drinks in two 
hours, and one-half of the male college students consume five drinks in two 
hours.167 So, why does this matter? 
The problem with binge-drinking is that college students experience a 
multitude of adverse consequences, whether they participate in the drinking or 
not.168 These consequences include health problems, injury, death, academic 
problems, assault, and sexual abuse.169 A 2001 Harvard study examining the 
secondhand effects of alcohol among underage students found the following 
effects, among others: insults/humiliation, serious arguments/quarrels, property 
damage, pushing, hitting/assaults, unwanted sexual advances, and sexual assault 
or date rape.170 
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Included in a variety of the studies is the consequence of sexual assault.171 
The NIAAA states that more than 97,000 students between the ages of 18–24 are 
victims of alcohol-related sexual assault.172 Other college student surveys found 
that approximately 50 percent of college women have been sexually assaulted.173 
Data from other studies show that around three percent of college women are 
victims of rape, which translates into nearly 35 allegations or instances of rape 
out of every 1,000 female students.174 However, women are not the only 
victims.175 Other studies show that one percent of male students also reported 
experiencing attempted sexual penetration without their consent.176 
Statistics on this subject are not comprehensive because sexual assaults are 
often unreported.177 However, statistics are consistent in stating that at least 50 
percent of sexual assaults are associated with alcohol use.178 Additionally, when 
alcohol is consumed before a sexual assault, it is usually consumed by both 
parties.179 Out of the alcohol-related sexual assaults that are reported, both parties 
consumed alcohol roughly 81 percent of the time.180 Another study discovered 
even more staggering numbers181—it found that 55 percent of the sexual assaults 
reported by college women involved alcohol, and in 97 percent of those assaults, 
both the victim and the perpetrator consumed alcohol.182 
While there are movements across the United States to create programs for 
alcohol awareness and prevention of underage drinking on college campuses,183 
sexual assault involving intoxication by both parties remains omnipresent.184 The 
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law should accommodate this now all-too-familiar occurrence. An accused 
offender should not be disadvantaged under the law because he was intoxicated 
when the alleged victim may have been in an equal or enhanced intoxicated 
condition. Under the 1962 MPC, however, that is regrettably the case.185 
Adopting the proposed changes to the MPC would concede that mutually 
intoxicated sexual assault frequently occurs, that it occurs among a staggering 
number of the nation’s young adults, much like alcoholism affects a staggering 
number of adults,186 and that the law should accommodate the situation so that 
the intoxicated condition of both parties is legally relevant.187 
Adopting the draft could result in fewer convictions of men who commit 
sexual assault by claiming they were intoxicated and, thus, did not have the 
requisite mens rea for the offense.188 While it is possible that an offender may 
escape conviction the first time, the likelihood that a repeat offender could deny 
awareness of the risk of becoming intoxicated more than once is incredibly 
low.189 
If John, for the first time, set out to get Jane drunk in order to have sex with 
her, he may be able to claim he was unaware of the risk in getting drunk and 
unaware that it would cause him to engage in improper sexual behavior.190 He 
may be acquitted if able to prove this.191 Yet, it would still be difficult to prove 
unawareness because the prosecutor could introduce evidence of the offender’s 
behavior through witness testimony.192 Therefore, the risk of a first-time offender 
using alcohol as an excuse remains moderately low.193 
However, if acquitted and he then intentionally gets Sally drunk and has sex 
with her, a judge and jury would surely be unconvinced that he was unaware yet 
again of the risk in getting drunk.194 Thus, he would only be able to use his 
intoxication as a defense once, at most.195 
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b. Effects of Alcohol on Mental Processes 
The 1962 MPC commentary acknowledges that nearly everyone knows the 
consequences of excessive drinking on human behavior.196 It notes however, that 
a problem arises “when the actor’s intoxication is adduced to disprove an element 
of the offense with which he is charged and is relevant to do so, but when its 
admissibility for such purpose has been restricted by the law.”197 The 1962 MPC 
comment authors later attempted to argue why there is no problem by pinpointing 
the precise issue of disallowing evidence of an accused’s intoxication for crimes 
with a mens rea of recklessness.198 
The effects of alcohol on behavior and mental processes is highlighted in a 
footnote to a paragraph, which states the issue with disallowing evidence of an 
accused’s intoxicated state.199 “As a matter of logic, the fact of acute alcoholic 
intoxication may be ground an inference that the actor did not act with 
knowledge or purpose or recklessness required as an element of the crime.”200 
Because alcohol is a depressant, it can alter a person’s “perceptive capacity and 
mental powers.”201 
This statement is not conjecture but is grounded in science.202 The CDC lists 
the effects of alcohol on the human body at various blood alcohol 
concentrations.203 For example, John from the above hypothetical is a male who 
engaged in binge drinking—therefore according to NIAAA statistics, he may 
have consumed five drinks in two hours.204 If John consumed five drinks in two 
hours, under the CDC standards, he would have had a blood alcohol 
concentration at 0.10 percent.205 At 0.10 percent, John would suffer from 
deterioration of reaction time and control, slowed thinking, slurred speech, and 
poor coordination.206 After only five drinks, presumably less than he actually 
consumed due to his description of the night, his mental processes were 
altered.207 If John was not comatose or vomiting, his BAC could have been 
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around 0.20 percent.208 At 0.20 percent, John would feel dazed, confused, or 
disoriented.209 He would need help standing or walking, and would likely 
experience a blackout.210 
The ALI draft has not fully developed the issue of how intoxicated an actor 
must be in order to use evidence of his intoxicated state to rebut his 
recklessness.211 A person passing in and out of consciousness would meet the 
requirement, but whether anything less than that would suffice is unclear.212 
Would a 0.10 percent BAC resulting in an alteration of mental processes be 
enough for John to rebut his recklessness? Or would John’s BAC need to be 
higher, say at 0.20 percent where he is likely experiencing a blackout? The 
tentative draft left this unanswered. 
Jane, a binge-drinking female, according to NIAAA statistics, may have 
consumed four drinks in two hours.213 If Jane consumed four drinks in two hours, 
under the CDC’s standards, she would have a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 
percent.214 At 0.08 percent, Jane’s muscle coordination would have been poor, 
her judgment would have been impaired, her self-control would have been 
impaired, and her reasoning and memory would have been impaired.215 After 
only four drinks, presumably less than she actually drank according to her to 
recount of events that night, her mental processes would have been 
compromised.216 Similar to John, if Jane was not comatose or vomiting, it is 
possible she had a BAC of 0.20 percent.217 If Jane had a BAC of 0.20 percent, 
she would suffer from confusion, disorientation, inability to stand or walk, and a 
blackout.218 
The ALI also does not fully develop the issue of how intoxicated a 
participant must be in order to be considered incapacitated and, thus, incapable of 
consent.219 The ALI notes the challenges in drawing the line of incapacitation, 
including that intoxication causes different effects and not every person is 
affected equally by the same amount of alcohol.220 Therefore, even if a specific 
BAC level were adopted, such as 0.10 or 0.20, there would be no definitive 
 
208. Effects At Specific B.A.C. Levels, B.R.A.D. 21, available at http://www.brad21.org/effects_at_ 
specific_bac.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 cmt. at 190 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 52015). 
212. Id. at 90. 
213. College Drinking, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, supra note 160. 
214. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, IMPAIRED DRIVING: GET THE FACTS, BAC EFFECTS, 
supra note 203. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. B.R.A.D. 21, supra note 208. 
218. Id. 
219. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 cmt. at 90 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015). 
220. Id. 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 48 
443 
answer based on the BAC level alone as to how the level actually affected the 
victim during the event at issue; especially if the offender’s BAC was not 
measured immediately after the alleged assault occurred.221 
Even by a modest estimate of the amount of alcohol that Jane and John 
consumed on the night of their sexual encounter, both parties certainly had 
altered mental and physical processes.222 If they both had higher levels of BAC, 
then each could have experienced a blackout.223 Yet, under current law, John 
cannot introduce his intoxicated mental state to rebut the presumption that he 
consciously disregarded the risk of sexual assault, while Jane can state that her 
intoxication rendered her incapable of consent.224 
Adopting the proposed changes would align science with law.225 Studies 
show that at five drinks, John is mentally impaired,226 but the law states that he 
was consciously aware regardless of that evidence.227 While the ALI has not 
resolved the issues concerning the level of intoxication required for both parties, 
the proposed draft focuses on two inquiries: (1) “whether the degree of 
intoxication was so extreme as to effectively preclude the expression of 
unwillingness”228 on the part of the victim; and (2) whether the actor knew (or 
recklessly disregarded) that the other party was intoxicated to that degree.229 Both 
inquiries permit either party to introduce extrinsic evidence of intoxication.230 
The proposed changes would allow John to argue the physical and physiological 
effects of his level of intoxication in order to disprove the mens rea by allowing 
evidence relevant to his recklessness, as is allowed for purpose and knowledge.231 
Consciousness could then be altered through intoxication in the eyes of the law 
as it is altered through intoxication in the eyes of science. 
3. Elimination of Gender-Biased Protection 
As mentioned in Part II.C.,232 the tentative draft retains the protection for 
voluntarily intoxicated victims.233 The most basic reason for this is that each 
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individual has a right to autonomous choice, including whether to drink or to 
engage in sexual activity.234 However, one idea in American culture is that if you 
allow yourself to drink to the point of blacking out or passing out, then you are 
“inviting inappropriate conduct upon yourself.”235 This cultural idea has spread to 
juries, causing them to believe a voluntarily intoxicated victim was either 
partially or fully responsible for his or her sexual assault.236 
The phenomenon of victim blaming may be explained through various 
stigma.237 One stigma is that women who voluntarily consume alcohol are more 
sexually promiscuous.238 Men then interpret their sexual promiscuity as consent 
to sexual activity.239 The stigma may also be the result of a voluntarily 
intoxicated victim failing to conform to societal gender norms.240 Alcohol 
intoxication is traditionally viewed as a male activity in which women should not 
participate.241 If they do, they contradict the gender norm and are judged more 
severely than if men engage in the behavior.242 
The stigmas surrounding women and voluntary intoxication show that 
women are susceptible to sexual assault in situations involving alcohol and why 
the law should provide full protection for victims like Jane.243 According to 
current law, Jane has done nothing culpable by getting drunk.244 Yet, if Jane 
simply engaged in voluntary intoxication, which the law says is not criminal, 
why should John be at fault for the very same conduct? 
The simple answer is that he should not. If restricted to the facts of John and 
Jane’s case, then there is no other theory of culpability other than John’s choice 
to become intoxicated.245 He did not have the requisite mens rea prior to the 
offense by getting Jane drunk in order to have sex with her, and he was not aware 
that his drinking would result in harmful sexual conduct.246 Therefore, the only 
distinction between the victim and the accused is gender. 
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Consider what happens if a man claims that a woman engaged in unwanted 
sexual behavior.247 Although rape is the least reported of all violent crimes,248 the 
claim that male victimization is uncommon is faulty.249 The minimization of male 
victimization occurs because of underreporting and scant legal action concerning 
male victims.250 The causes of underreporting include: the emphasis placed on 
female victimization, the notion that females are more vulnerable to sexual 
assault, the belief that men are unlikely victims that perpetuates an expectation of 
masculinity on men, and the portrayal of male victimization as harmless.251 This 
preexisting male discourse creates obstacles for victimized males, including the 
notion that “real men” can protect themselves and aroused men want the sexual 
encounter.252 
The discourse harms males victimized by both women and by men.253 
Additionally, victimized homosexual men are accused of “ask[ing] for it.”254 The 
traditional paradigm that women are sexual victims and males are invincible 
downplays male victimization.255 Perpetuating the concept of “masculinized 
dominance and feminized subordination” hinders understanding of sexual 
victimization of all people.256 The fact is, despite underreporting, sexual assault 
occurs across both genders.257 
Therefore, because sexual assault involving intoxication of both offenders is 
so prevalent and because sexual assault is gender-neutral, the law should reflect 
an unbiased treatment of offenders.258 The proposed draft eliminates this 
disparate treatment by allowing both parties to introduce evidence of their 
intoxication, which permits the jury to analyze the actual mental processes of the 
parties to determine who is culpable.259 Thus, instead of the jury convicting based 
on traditional sexual biases, the focus in mutually intoxicated sexual assaults is 
whether the offender had a culpable mindset despite the intoxication, a fact 
which is influenced by science not prejudice.260 
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Consequently, John would have the opportunity to present evidence that he 
was unaware of the risk of getting drunk and unaware that the risk of getting 
drunk would result in harmful sexual activity.261 Or if the facts were reversed, 
and John claimed Jane sexually assaulted him, Jane would have the opportunity 
to present evidence that she was unaware of the risk of getting drunk and 
unaware that the risk of getting drunk would result in harmful sexual activity.262 
If the jury believes the evidence, then either party could be acquitted of the 
criminal charges.263 
4. Remaining Questions 
With the promise of advancements, the proposed draft raises many questions. 
First, why should a sexual aggressor who deliberately becomes drunk in order to 
claim lack of awareness be able to use intoxication as a defense? While this is a 
legitimate concern, assume that the prosecutor discovered that John routinely 
gets drunk with his fraternity friends in order to sexually assault females like 
Jane. Even if John were calculated enough to do so, a prosecutor would likely be 
able to contradict his lack of awareness. If the law allows John to make the claim 
once that he lacked awareness of the risk that drinking alcohol would lead to 
sexual aggression, then he would have, at most, one opportunity to claim that he 
was unaware of the effects of alcohol. 
This leads to a second question: why should the offender be able to use the 
defense even once? There is no debate that allowing even one sexual assault to 
go unprosecuted is unacceptable. While there is a risk that a sexual aggressor 
could use the defense once, the decision remains in hands of the jury to 
determine whether the evidence surrounding the offender’s intoxication supports 
the defense.264 The proposed change only allows the evidence of intoxication to 
be introduced and considered; it does not create a presumptive conclusion that 
the offender was unaware of the risk in becoming intoxicated simply because he 
claims it.265 Consequently, the sexual assault will still be prosecuted if the 
evidence does not support the offender’s claim.266 
Another concern mentioned in the 1962 MPC commentary is how a 
prosecutor can secure a conviction.267 In a case involving the mens rea of purpose 
or knowledge, a prosecutor often has evidence to rebut a defendant’s claim that 
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he did not have purpose or knowledge. 268 For example, if the state must prove 
that an offender knowingly sold stolen property and the offender claims he did 
not know the goods were stolen, the prosecutor may be able to rebut the 
offender’s claim with evidence that the offender paid far less than market value 
for the property.269 
Similarly, in the intoxication context, a prosecutor may be able to rebut what 
the accused claims his mental state was at the time of the crime with witnesses 
who observed his behavior. Witnesses could support evidence that the accused 
did not seem particularly intoxicated or that he spoke clearly after the crime.270 
While some of the concerns surrounding the proposed draft can be answered 
and alleviated, other moral questions remain. The 1962 MPC commentary stated 
that becoming severely intoxicated has little, if no, social value.271 By changing 
the law of intoxication, is the proposed draft in essence stating that becoming 
severely intoxicated now has social value? In addition, by legally acknowledging 
that mutually intoxicated sexual acts occur so frequently, is the proposed draft 
condoning this behavior? Are intoxicated offenders who commit sexual assault 
gaining more leniency than they should be? Lastly, should the law adapt to 
changing social attitudes towards intoxication in the same way it adapted to 
same-sex marriage and other social movements? 
The response to all of those questions is simple: the goal of the proposed 
draft and the potential new law is to reserve the criminal law for culpable 
conduct.272 If that culpable conduct includes copious alcohol consumption and 
sexual activity that occurs between mutually intoxicated parties, then the criminal 
law should respond to those activities.273 As far as leniency for intoxicated 
offenders who commit sexual assault, the choice to convict or acquit those 
offenders remains in the hands of the jury.274 The proposed draft changes what 
evidence is permitted, but not the burden of proof required for conviction.275 
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Therefore, the decision to be lenient or not remains with the same people and 
within the same parameters.276 
One pivotal legal question lingers under the current proposed draft: how 
intoxicated must an offender be to negate his mens rea? Can John negate his 
mens rea with a 0.10 blood alcohol concentration after five drinks? Again, the 
answer lies in his culpability. If his intoxicated conduct was culpable, then he 
may not negate his mens rea; but if his intoxicated conduct was not culpable, 
then he may negate his mens rea.277 On balance, the possible results of the 
proposed changes are more optimistic than problematic.278 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The proposed changes to the MPC aim to navigate the law away from the 
rigid confines of the traditional approach to intoxication and calibrate it to 
address the contemporary issues involving intoxication across the United 
States.279 The proposed draft has the potential to: restore the uniformity of 
culpability proportionate to liability in nearly all provisions of the MPC; place 
mutually intoxicated parties on an even keel when a sexual assault is alleged; and 
permit science and behavior to inform whether an individual was aware and 
consciously disregarded a risk in getting drunk and engaging in harmful sexual 
behavior.280 
Only time and adopting these changes will definitively address the plethora 
of remaining moral and legal questions. Until then, thousands of other college 
students accused of assault, like John, are unable to produce evidence of their 
intoxication in court, despite the fact that the alleged victim was equally 
intoxicated and heavy drinking is “a normal part of college life.”281 
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